PrefaceExecutive Summary

The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second-largest economy, the largest goods exporter, the largest crude oil importer, the largest soybean importer, and the largest energy consumer, and each of these is a vulnerability. China’s economic engine depends on a fragile architecture of imported energy, food, raw materials, and technology—much of it transiting contested maritime chokepoints and sourced from States increasingly subject to American pressure.

On the Millennial Media Offensive podcast, we have argued that the U.S. actions—the military seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran beginning February 28, 2026, escalating technology export controls, and sustained tariff campaigns—are not isolated events. They possibly constitute a coherent strategy to weaken the States in China’s economic and strategic orbit thereby degrading Beijing’s position in anticipation of or to deter a potential kinetic confrontation with China.

Note: This report was finalized on March 6, 2026, while the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran and Iran’s retaliatory strikes remain ongoing. The status of the Strait of Hormuz is fluid; traffic through the waterway has been severely disrupted. Figures and assessments are based on the most current available reporting but should be understood in the context of a rapidly evolving situation.

We examine China’s dependencies across five pillars—energy, food, technology, finance, and strategic partnerships—analyze Beijing’s mitigation efforts, assess the “domino” logic of recent U.S. actions, and project which states or chokepoints may be targeted next. The analysis is grounded in publicly available data and draws on reporting from institutional sources including the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, the RAND Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

Section IThe Domino Framework: Stripping China of its Partners

The classical “domino theory” of the Cold War posited that the fall of one state to communism would trigger the fall of its neighbors. The contemporary variant identified herein and on the Millennial Media Offensive podcast operates in reverse: rather than fearing the spread of a rival ideology, Washington is systematically weakening the regimes that provide China and Russia with discounted energy, strategic depth, and geopolitical cover—seeking to isolate and weaken Beijing.

In a February 2026 analysis, the Lowy Institute’s Ross Babbage described the emerging pattern with unusual directness: U.S. actions are “methodically stripping China and Russia of their partners,” working to “isolate Beijing and Moscow from their international partners and deprive them of any major means of external support.”¹ This analysis dovetails with the framework articulated in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s concept of “strategic compression”—a condition where China’s decision space narrows as its timeline for action accelerates under converging demographic, economic, and political pressures.²

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy reframed China primarily as an economic rival and emphasized hemispheric security. The accompanying 2026 National Defense Strategy centered a “strong denial defence” of the First Island Chain from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines.³ Beneath these doctrinal documents lies a deeper operational logic: deny China access to discounted energy, restrict its access to advanced technology, strain its food supply chains, and ensure that in a crisis over Taiwan, Beijing’s logistical position would be untenable.

Venezuela: The First Domino

On January 3, 2026, the United States launched a military operation to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, transporting them to New York to face drug trafficking charges. The operation, designated “Absolute Resolve,” marked the most dramatic U.S. military intervention in Latin America in decades.⁴

The energy implications for China were immediate and significant. Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, had been exporting roughly 765,000 barrels per day in the months preceding the operation, with nearly 75% of that volume bound for China through shadow fleets and discounted arrangements.⁵ China’s “teapot” refineries—independent processors that handle significant volumes of sanctioned crude—were particularly exposed. An estimated 300,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan supply to China was placed at immediate risk.⁵

Beyond oil flows, the intervention threatened Chinese investment in Venezuela’s upstream sector. China National Petroleum Corporation maintained joint ventures with PDVSA, while China Concord Resources Corp. had announced plans in August 2025 to invest over $1 billion in a Venezuelan oil project.⁶ (Chinese diplomats were in Caracas at the time of the operation.) The White House initially demanded that Venezuela sever economic ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba, though Trump subsequently softened this position.⁷

On the other hand, the strategic picture was more ambiguous than it appeared. As the Atlantic Council’s Melanie Hart observed, Beijing’s relationship with the Maduro regime had been an “albatross”—Venezuela’s cratering economy was not delivering the returns China had anticipated, and Maduro’s stolen election had damaged Beijing’s reputation across Latin America.⁸ China’s rhetorical response was forceful but its concrete actions were minimal, suggesting that Beijing calculated the loss was manageable.

The more significant effect was structural: the operation demonstrated Washington’s willingness to use military force to reshape energy flows in its hemisphere, signaling to other States in China’s orbit that their partnerships with Beijing carry escalating risks.

Iran: The Second Domino

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched major combat operations against Iran, targeting the country’s nuclear program, ballistic missile infrastructure, military installations, and senior leadership. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.⁹ Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed the death and described it as an act of open war.¹⁰

Iran responded with retaliatory strikes against Israeli territory and U.S. military installations across the Gulf Cooperation Council States and Jordan. The conflict rapidly disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical energy chokepoint.¹¹

For China, the timing was acutely damaging. Iran had been China’s third-largest oil supplier by actual volume (official Chinese customs data does not acknowledge Iranian imports, which are relabeled as Malaysian or other origins). According to the analytics firm Kpler, China imported approximately 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian crude in 2025, accounting for 12% of total imports.¹² When combined with the disruption to other Gulf suppliers whose exports transit Hormuz, roughly half of China’s crude oil imports—including Saudi, Iraqi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, and Qatari volumes—were placed at varying degrees of risk.¹³

China moved quickly to hold emergency talks with Iran regarding the safe passage of Qatari LNG and crude vessels through the Strait.¹⁴ Domestically, Chinese refineries reduced operating rates and the government ordered a temporary suspension of refined fuel exports to conserve supply.¹⁵

China’s Foreign Ministry condemned the strikes as violations of international law and the UN Charter. Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the operation “unacceptable” and condemned the killing of a sovereign state’s leader.¹⁶ However, as with Venezuela, Beijing’s actual response was constrained—underlining the limits of China’s ability to project power or protect its partners beyond its immediate periphery.

Section IIEnergy Dependencies: The Structural Vulnerability

Energy security is one of the three foundational pillars of China’s economic security framework, alongside food security and financial stability, as identified in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025)—the first such plan to include a dedicated section on economic security.¹⁷

The Oil Import Architecture

China’s crude oil imports reached a record 11.6 million barrels per day in 2025, with over 70% of total consumption sourced from abroad.¹⁸ More than 90% of these imports arrive by sea.¹⁸ Five countries—Russia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia (predominantly relabeled Iranian and Venezuelan crude), Iraq, and Brazil—accounted for 62% of total imports.¹⁸

The Middle East remains the dominant supply region. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, China imported approximately 42% of its crude from official Middle Eastern sources in 2025, rising to over 50% when Iranian volumes disguised under other flags are included. Roughly 31% of China’s LNG imports also originated from the Middle East, with Qatar alone supplying 28%.¹²

Sources: Columbia CGEP, Kpler, Visual Capitalist, U.S. EIA. Figures are approximations for 2025 and vary by reporting methodology.

The Chokepoint Problem

China’s maritime energy supply funnels through two critical chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz, between Oman and Iran, handled approximately 20.9 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025—roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption. China alone accounted for 37.7% of crude oil and condensate flows through the Strait.¹⁹

Further east, the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia carries approximately 80% of China’s imported crude oil. The term “Malacca Dilemma,” coined by then-General Secretary Hu Jintao in 2003, captures Beijing’s recognition that this narrow waterway—less than 2.5 kilometers wide at its narrowest—represents a structural vulnerability that could be exploited by the U.S. Navy or allied forces in a crisis.²⁰

In a Taiwan contingency, both chokepoints could be interdicted or contested. The U.S. Navy’s 5th and 7th Fleets maintain significant presence capability in both regions. This geographic reality means that China’s energy security is, at the moment, contingent on the willingness of the United States to permit uninterrupted passage.

China’s Mitigation Strategies

Strategic petroleum reserves. China has invested heavily in oil stockpiling. As of early 2026, China held approximately 1.39 billion barrels of oil in storage—sufficient to cover roughly 104–120 days of net crude imports. According to Rystad Energy, China stockpiled 430,000 barrels per day in 2025, representing 83% of the year’s increase in crude imports.¹⁸ National oil companies planned an additional 169 million barrels of new storage capacity for 2025–2026.

Overland pipeline diversification. China has constructed oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia (the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, operational since 2006), Russia (the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline), Myanmar (the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline providing access to the Bay of Bengal), and has invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor linking Gwadar Port to Xinjiang. However, these overland routes collectively carry only a fraction of China’s maritime import volume. The Myanmar pipeline, for example, transfers approximately 160 million barrels per year—less than 7% of the oil that annually transits the Strait of Malacca.²⁰

Domestic energy transition. China is aggressively deploying new energy vehicles (NEVs), which displaced an estimated 28 million tons of gasoline consumption in 2024. Vehicle electrification and improving fuel economy have ended Chinese total transport fuel demand growth, and domestic gasoline consumption has already peaked.²¹ China also marginally increased domestic crude production in 2025 and retains the capacity to expand overland pipeline connectivity with Russia if energy security becomes an overriding priority.²¹

Supplier diversification. China has diversified away from Middle Eastern dependence toward Russia, Brazil, and other sources. Russia has become China’s single largest crude supplier at roughly 20% of imports, with deliveries increasing for three consecutive years following Western sanctions that prompted Moscow to offer discounted prices.²² Brazil’s exports to China grew 164% over the past decade.²³

Despite these efforts, the fundamental constraint persists: China cannot currently replace seaborne oil imports at scale, and its stockpiles, while substantial, provide months—not years—of insulation against sustained disruption.

Section IIIFood Security: The Soybean Chokepoint

China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest food importer in 2021. Its food self-sufficiency ratio declined to approximately 66% by 2020, driven by a structural shift in dietary patterns as rising incomes fueled demand for meat, dairy, and cooking oils—all of which require imported feed grains and oilseeds.²⁴

The Soybean Vulnerability

China’s soybean dependency is its most acute food security vulnerability. China is the world’s largest soybean consumer, with a self-sufficiency rate of less than 20%. In 2024, soybean imports reached 105 million tons—representing over 60% of global soybean trade—with an import dependence rate of 85%.²⁵

The concentration risk is stark. In 2022, Brazil and the United States together supplied over 92% of China’s soybean imports. While China has diversified toward Brazil (which supplied 69% of China’s soybeans by 2023, up from 20% in 2000), this merely shifts the concentration risk rather than eliminating it.²⁶ Moreover, 65% of China’s total soybean imports in 2020 were transported through the Strait of Malacca.²⁷

Soybeans are not merely a food crop for China; they are the foundation of the livestock sector. Feed grain consumption exceeded 300 million metric tons in 2024, surpassing demand for staple grains and accounting for over 40% of total grain consumption. Since feed costs represent more than 60% of total livestock production costs, disruptions to soybean supply would cascade rapidly into meat and egg prices, threatening social stability.²⁵

Mitigation Strategies

Beijing has pursued a multi-pronged approach to reduce soybean vulnerability: mandating reduced soymeal inclusion rates in livestock feed, promoting synthetic amino acid substitution, diversifying import sources toward Argentina and Russia, approving genetically modified soybeans and corn for commercial use (a significant policy reversal given long-standing public opposition), and constructing railway grain terminals at the Russia-China border to enable overland grain supply.²⁶ However, continued growth in total feed demand has kept soybean imports at historically high levels, and near-term self-sufficiency remains out of reach.²⁸

Section IVTechnology and Semiconductors: The Innovation Bottleneck

The Silicon Shield

Taiwan produces the majority of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced chips needed for AI applications. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone controls approximately 70% of global foundry revenue and over 90% of leading-edge production at 3nm and 5nm nodes.²⁹

China remains profoundly dependent on this supply chain. Despite setting targets under Made in China 2025 to achieve 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency, China’s actual self-sufficiency rate is closer to 16%, and the country still imports over $400 billion worth of semiconductors annually.³⁰ U.S. export controls have progressively restricted China’s access to advanced chipmaking equipment and the most sophisticated AI-capable processors.

RAND Corporation research notes that while China’s direct trade vulnerability to the United States is diminishing as it shifts export markets and reduces import dependencies, its continued reliance on American and allied technologies—particularly software and semiconductor manufacturing equipment subject to export controls—remains a more acute point of leverage.³¹

China’s Self-Sufficiency Push

Beijing has invested billions through its “Big Fund” and other state-directed mechanisms to develop domestic semiconductor capacity. The 2025 Recommendations for the next Five-Year Plan emphasize “new quality productive forces” and innovation-driven productivity. China achieved a notable breakthrough in early 2025 with the launch of DeepSeek, an AI system that demonstrated competitiveness with leading American models.³²

However, RAND’s assessment is that these gains, while real, have not yet eliminated critical dependencies. Beijing’s techno-industrial policies are reducing vulnerabilities, but the process is incremental, and U.S. export controls continue to target the most advanced nodes of the supply chain where China’s gap is widest.³¹

Section VFinancial and Structural Vulnerabilities

China’s domestic economy provides the backdrop against which all external vulnerabilities must be assessed—and that backdrop is unfavorable. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV consultation identified a protracted adjustment in the property sector, spillovers to local government finances, a debt overhang, persistent weakness in domestic demand, and deflationary pressures.³³ State-led, debt-financed investment has produced weakening productivity and excess supply in tradable sectors.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute characterizes the situation more starkly: youth unemployment above 20%, debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 270% by some estimates, growth rates potentially lower than official statistics claim, and a collapse in foreign direct investment for three consecutive years.² FDI into China fell 9.5% in 2025, the third consecutive year of contraction.³⁴

This domestic fragility amplifies the impact of external shocks. As RAND observes, “the immediate problem for Beijing is that a trade shock would occur when the domestic economy is relatively weak.”³¹ The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2025 report notes that China is on track to run a trade surplus exceeding its record $992 billion from 2024, but that this surplus masks structural weakness: it reflects the dumping of excess supply into global markets because domestic demand cannot absorb it.³⁵

Section VIThe Next Dominoes: Projected Targets

If the supposition described above is correct—that Washington is systematically degrading China’s strategic periphery—then the question of which states or relationships may be targeted next becomes analytically significant. Several candidates exist.

Myanmar

Myanmar hosts the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, providing Beijing with a modest but strategically significant bypass of the Strait of Malacca. The country has been in civil war since the military coup of February 2021, with the junta losing territory to resistance forces. The Kyaukphyu deep-water port, a node in China’s “String of Pearls” Indian Ocean strategy, depends on junta stability. A collapse of the military government or intensification of conflict could disrupt pipeline operations and degrade one of China’s few overland energy alternatives. The Council on Foreign Relations includes Myanmar’s accelerating state collapse as a conflict to watch in 2026.³⁶ While U.S. action against Myanmar is unlikely to take a direct military form, support for opposition groups or tightened sanctions on the junta’s revenue streams could indirectly threaten Chinese infrastructure.

Pakistan

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, connects Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea to China’s Xinjiang region. It was designed to provide China with an alternative energy and trade route bypassing the Malacca Strait entirely. However, CPEC has been plagued by security threats from Baloch separatist insurgents, cost overruns, and political instability in Islamabad. Pakistan’s economy remains fragile and dependent on IMF lending. Washington’s leverage over Pakistan via the IMF and bilateral economic ties provides a non-kinetic pathway to constrain CPEC’s development. Any further deterioration in India-Pakistan relations—itself a scenario CFR identifies for 2026³⁶— or disruptions from the emergent “open war” between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban would further jeopardize the corridor’s viability.

Russia

Russia is now China’s single largest crude oil supplier and a critical overland energy partner. The Sino-Russian relationship has deepened significantly since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with Moscow offering discounted energy in exchange for Chinese economic support. However, the partnership is asymmetric and carries risks for China: deepening ties with a sanctioned state increases Beijing’s exposure to secondary sanctions and complicates its relationships with European and other trading partners.

Notably, the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy softened language on Russia and sought to decouple Moscow from Beijing.³⁷ If the Ukraine conflict reaches a settlement that partially rehabilitates Russia’s relationship with Europe, China could find itself losing a captive discounted energy supplier without gaining equivalent concessions. Conversely, if Washington intensifies secondary sanctions targeting Chinese entities that facilitate Russian oil trade, Beijing faces difficult choices between energy security and broader economic interests.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of China’s export markets, its maritime supply lines, and its geopolitical ambitions. The region is “ground zero” for what the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission describes as the “second China Shock”—the surge of Chinese exports displacing local manufacturing, causing hundreds of thousands of job losses in Indonesia and factory closures in Thailand.³⁵ This economic friction undermines China’s claim to regional economic leadership. U.S. efforts to draw Southeast Asian states into closer security alignment—through arms sales, joint exercises, and trade agreements—could further erode China’s position in what Beijing considers its strategic backyard.

Cuba

With Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba halted following the Maduro seizure, the island’s long-running economic crisis has intensified, with rationing of transport, electricity, food, and water. The Lowy Institute assessment suggests the communist regime may be approaching a tipping point.¹ While Cuba is not a major factor in China’s strategic calculus, its potential collapse would represent another domino falling in the Western Hemisphere, further narrowing the space for Chinese and Russian influence in the Americas.

Section VIIThe Taiwan Scenario: Convergence of Vulnerabilities

All of the dependencies described above converge in the scenario that U.S. strategy is ultimately designed to address: a potential Chinese military operation against Taiwan.

In such a scenario, the United States and allied navies could interdict or contest both the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, severing the majority of China’s seaborne energy and food supplies. China’s strategic petroleum reserves would provide approximately 100–120 days of coverage—a significant buffer, but one that would deplete under sustained conflict. Overland pipelines from Russia and Central Asia would continue to function but could not compensate for the loss of maritime volumes.

Bloomberg Economics has estimated that a Taiwan blockade would cost the global economy, including China, $5 trillion in the first year alone.²⁹ The PLA is reportedly targeting 2027 for Taiwan-scenario operational readiness, while December 2025 exercises were described as the largest Taiwan-focused drills ever conducted.³⁸

The Atlantic Council’s March 2026 analysis of the Iran crisis offers a sobering observation for Beijing: while China would suffer from a Middle East oil outage, a crisis with disproportionate LNG disruption could actually benefit the PRC relative to its regional rivals (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), since natural gas represents a smaller share of China’s energy mix and it possesses more domestic alternatives. However, “the most important lesson for Indo-Pacific capitals should be the importance of strengthening energy security ahead of a potential Taiwan crisis.”²¹

The strategic logic of the “domino” approach thus becomes clear: each partner or supply relationship degraded before a Taiwan crisis is one less source of support Beijing can draw upon during one and one more example of the costs of alignment with China that other States must weigh.

Section VIIIAcknowledgements: Risks and Counterfactuals

Several important caveats apply to the theory that U.S. actions constitute a coherent “domino” strategy.

Attribution of intent. It is possible to overstate the strategic coherence of actions that may be driven by disparate motivations—counter-narcotics and nonproliferation were stated as primary objectives in the Venezuela and Iran operations respectively. However, the consistency of the outcome—the progressive destruction of Beijing’s partners—suggests, at minimum, that the strategic benefit to Washington was recognized even if it was not the sole driver.

Unintended consequences. Each “domino” carries its own second-order effects. The Atlantic Council’s analysis of the Venezuela operation argued that it may ultimately benefit China by removing an albatross from Beijing’s neck and potentially obliging the United States to inherit the costs of Venezuelan stabilization.⁸ The Iran conflict has generated a genuine energy crisis that harms American allies in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) as much or more than it harms China, and the broader pattern of American military intervention may push wavering States closer to Beijing rather than further from it as countries seek counterweights to unpredictable U.S. power.

China’s adaptive capacity. Beijing is not passive. Five years of preparation for prolonged economic competition have reduced many vulnerabilities, and RAND’s assessment is that U.S. leverage over China is diminishing as Beijing diversifies markets, stockpiles critical materials, and reduces import dependencies.³¹ China’s control over critical supply chains—from smartphones to batteries to rare earth minerals—provides its own form of leverage. In 2025, Beijing imposed export restrictions on rare earths and magnets in trade negotiations with Washington, demonstrating its willingness to weaponize supply chain dominance.³⁵

The time dimension. The effectiveness of the “domino” approach depends on timing. If it succeeds in degrading China’s position before Beijing achieves its self-sufficiency targets in energy, food, technology, and military capability, the strategy strengthens deterrence. If it merely accelerates Beijing’s timeline for action before those vulnerabilities are addressed, it could be destabilizing. As the Foreign Policy Research Institute warns, “every delay magnifies the gap between ambition and capability,” but strategic compression can also produce risk-taking behavior by States that perceive the dominoes falling.²